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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to hear this matter pursuant to Section
78-2a-3(2)(h) of the Utah Code.
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
Upon the answer and evidence taken, the Court shall determine whether the person
proceeded against is guilty of the contempt charged. If the Court finds the person is
guilty of the contempt, the Court may impose a fine not exceeding $1,000, order the
person incarcerated in the county jail not exceeding 30 days, or both. However, a
justice Court judge or court commissioner may punish for contempt by a fine not to
exceed $500.00 or by incarceration for five days or both.
Utah Code Annotated Section 78-32-10. Contempt — Action by Court.
If an actual loss or injury to a party in an action or special proceeding, prejudicial to
his rights therein, is caused by the contempt, the Court, in addition to the fine or
imprisonment imposed for the contempt or in place thereof, may order the person
proceeded against to pay the party aggrieved a sum of money sufficient to indemnify
him and to satisfy his costs and expenses; which order and the acceptance of money
under it is bar to an action by the aggrieved party for such loss and injury.
Utah Code Annotated Section 78-32-11. Damages to party aggrieved.
When the contempt consists in the omission to perform an act enjoined by law, which
is yet in the power of the person to perform, he may be imprisoned until he shall
perform it, or until released by the Court, and in such case the act must be specified
in the warrant of commitment.
Utah Code Annotated Section 78-32-12. Imprisonment to compel performance.
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STATEMENT OF CASE. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
AND DISPOSITION IN COURT
This action began on March 26,1993 when Plaintiff filed a Verified Motion for
Order to Show Cause to enforce certain provisions of the parties' divorce decree.1 In particular,
the Plaintiff claimed that the Defendant had failed to pay her certain proceeds from the
"HHEICO contract," as directed by the decree. The HHEICO contract was acquired during the
marriage and consisted of a promissory note secured by real estate. The Defendant was the
named beneficiary of the note. The divorce Court awarded the Plaintiff 65% of the net proceeds
of the HHEICO contract, which provided her with an income of $505.00 per month.2 ( R. 293316). At the time of filing her Motion, the Plaintiff did not know why her payments from the
HHEICO contract had ceased. She later found that the Defendant had pledged the contract as
security for a high risk loan and had subsequently lost the same by default. (R. 628-9. 392-3.
637-9, 660-2, 721-728, 739-743, 746).
The Plaintiff's Motion was heard on June 1,1993 by the Honorable Thomas N. Arnett.
Among other things, Commissioner Arnett recommended that judgment be awarded in favor of
*The parties were divorced on May 21, 1991.
Paragraph 7 of the divorce decree provides, "The Plaintiff is awarded sixty-five percent
(65%) of the net proceeds of the HHEICO contract and the Defendant is awarded thirty-five
percent (35%) of the net proceeds of the HHEICO contract. The current net proceeds from the
HHEICO contract are $777.00 per. (sic) The Plaintiff is entitled to receive 505.05 per month and
the Defendant is entitled to receive 271.95 per month from the HHEICO contract. In the event the
net amount received from the HHEICO contract shall differ from the $777.00 per month, then the
parties shall divide the net proceeds sixty-five percent (65%) to the Plaintiff and thirty-five percent
(35%) to the Defendant."
2

Plaintiff for the HHEICO contract arrears and certified the issue of contempt for trial. (R. 322).
The Defendant objected to the Commissioner's recommendation and a hearing on his objections
was held on August 11,1993 before the Honorable Anne M. Stirba. (R. 323-333, 336-340, 346).
At the hearing, the Defendant claimed that the divorce decree did not forbid him from selling or
encumbering the contract and that the Plaintiff was only entitled to 65% of whatever proceeds he
received from the note. In other words, if the Defendant's sale or disposal of the contract
resulted in no proceeds, the Plaintiff would get 65% of nothing. The Court, in ruling on the
matter, indicated that it appeared that the divorce decree did not restrict the Defendant from
selling the contract, but that the Plaintiff was entitled to 65% of the net proceeds from the sale of
the note. The Court further ruled that whether the note was discounted inappropriately in
violation of the decree and the issue of contempt should be reserved for trial. The Court added,
"there would need to be information presented to the Court as to the market value of that note
maybe at the time of the decree but certainly at the time it was sold, and what attempts were
made to sell it and whether it was discounted inappropriately." (R. 442-445).
Pursuant to Judge Stirba's August 11 ruling, a trial was conducted on October 15,
1993. At trial, the Court heard testimony concerning the nature of the HHEICO contract and
how it was lost. The Court also heard testimony concerning the number of payments left owing
on the contract, its present value, and the reasons given for the Defendant's actions in connection
therewith. (R. 623-698). After hearing the evidence, the Court determined that the Defendant
did not have the right to encumber or sell the HHEICO contract without obtaining the Plaintiff's
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prior consent. The Court found the Defendant in contempt of paragraph 7 of the divorce decree
and made the following ruling:
... [T]he Defendant is ordered to pay Plaintiff the amount of
$505.05 per month, beginning the first day of the month following
the entry of the final order in this matter, for 218 months, for a
total equal to the amount that Plaintiff would have received under
the HHEICO contract had the Defendant not lost it of $110,100.90
($505.05 X 218 = $110,100.90).
The Defendant is further ordered to serve 30 days in the
Salt Lake County Jail for his contempt of Court. The jail sentence
shall be suspended so long as Defendant complies in a timely
manner with the payment provisions set forth above. In the event
he defaults in any of the conditions, he shall be ordered to serve all
30 days without any further suspension.
Also, in the event the Defendant defaults in his monthly
payment obligation to Plaintiff, the Plaintiff shall determine the net
present value of the balance remaining to be owed to Plaintiff by
discounting the dollar amount by the contract rate (9.75%) and
shall be entitled to a judgment in that amount. So long as
Defendant is current in his monthly obligations, Plaintiff shall be
stayed from executing on the judgment.
Plaintiff is also awarded her reasonable and necessarily
incurred attorney's fees and costs in connection with this matter
which the Court finds to be $2,008.35. (R. 390-396).
In response to the Court's ruling, the Defendant filed a Motion to Alter or Amend
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Order and Judgment or in the alternative Motion for a
New Trial. Among other things, the Defendant complained that the Court's August and October
rulings were inconsistent. In August, he argued, the Court stated that the divorce decree did not
restrict him from selling the contract. Then, in October, the Court reversed itself and found that
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the Defendant did not have the right to unilaterally encumber the HHEICO contract. The
Defendant claimed he had been prejudiced because he had prepared for trial based on the
Court's August 11,1993 ruling and would have prepared differently had he known the Court's
ruling would change. (R. 398-466).
In order to allow the Defendant a full opportunity to present his case, and to clarify any
misunderstandings, the Court reopened the trial "for the limited purpose of hearing evidence
concerning whether the Defendant had the right under the Decree to encumber the HHEICO
contract, whether he had a right to encumber the contract without the consent of the Plaintiff, and
whether his conduct of pledging the HHEICO contract without the Plaintiff's consent constitutes
contempt of Court." (R. 485-490). Based on this ruling, a second trial was held on August 31,
1994. At the end of testimony, Judge Stirba again ruled that the Defendant did not have the right
to encumber or sell the HHEICO contract, found him in contempt thereof, and made findings and
rulings similar to those made after the October 15th trial. (R. 553-560). After resolution of
objections to the final documents, the Court's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order
and Judgment were signed on December 13,1994. (R. 590-602). The Defendant filed his Notice
of Appeal on January 23, 1995. (R. 612).
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
1. The parties were divorced by a decree of the trial Court on May 21,1991. (R.
268).
2. Paragraph 7 of the Divorce Decree provides as follows:
The Plaintiff is awarded 65% of the net proceeds of the HHEICO
contract and the Defendant is awarded 35% of the net proceeds of
the HHEICO contract. The current net proceeds from the
HHEICO contract are $777 per. (sic) The Plaintiff is entitled to
receive $505.05 per month and the Defendant is entitled to receive
$271.95 per month from the HHEICO contract. In the event the
net amount received from the HHEICO contract shall differ from
the $777 per month, then the parties shall divide the net proceeds
65% to the Plaintiff and 35% to the Defendant. (R. 271, 272).
3. The HHEICO contract resulted from the sale of an apartment building in which
the Defendant had an interest. The sale took place approximately 15 years ago and the
Defendant was given a promissory note to secure his interest. The note was assumed by several
different parties over the years. On May 29,1990, and pursuant to a further sale of the note, the
Defendant was given an All Inclusive Promissory Note secured by an All Inclusive Trust Deed in
the amount of $274,993.08. This note is what is referred to in the Divorce Decree as the
HHEICO contract. Pursuant to the terms of the note, the makers were obligated to pay
Defendant the amount of $2,577.46 each month beginning June 20,1990. After paying various
senior notes and encumbrances, $777.00 was left as net proceeds to be distributed pursuant to
the terms of the Divorce Decree. As set forth above, the HHEICO contract was secured by real
property. (R. 368-9, 392-3, 634-7, 717-8, 731, 733-4; Exhibit P-4).
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4. In or about November of 1992, the Defendant borrowed $25,000.00 from
David Moench and pledged the HHEICO contract as security. The money borrowed from
Moench was paid directly to LaRoy Orr so that Mr. Orr could purchase an option on some
mining property in Nevada. The Defendant was promised a return of $10,000.00 in addition to
the amount invested within 30 days and was also promised stock in the company which was to
purchase the land. The stock was penny stock traded on the Canadian stock exchange. None of
the promises made to the Defendant were secured by property of any kind. It was a completely
unsecured loan. (R. 392-3, 637-9, 658, 660-662, 721-728, 739-743, 746).
5. The Defendant was represented by counsel in the divorce proceedings,
received a copy of the divorce decree, had read the same, was familiar with the provisions
contained therein, and did not formally object to any of the provisions. (R. 633-4, 706, 734-6).
6. The Defendant was aware of the provision in the divorce decree concerning the
HHEICO contract from the time the divorce was granted, consented to the same, and agreed that
the Plaintiff be awarded 65% of the proceeds of the contract. Furthermore, it was never agreed,
implied or discussed that the Defendant would have the right to encumber the HHEICO contract.
(R. 634, 706, 736).
7. At the time the HHEICO contract was pledged, the Defendant was fully aware
of the provisions set forth in the divorce decree which gave Plaintiff 65% of the proceeds, and
knew she had an interest therein. He also had a copy of the decree at the time. Prior to pledging
the contract, the Defendant had been paying Plaintiff her share of the proceeds. (R. 706, 737,
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750-1).
8. The Defendant did not tell the Plaintiff that he was pledging the HHEICO
contract as security nor did he ask for her consent in doing so. (R. 639-40, 737-8).
9. The $25,000 loan was due on or about the first week of January, 1993. The
Defendant defaulted on the loan and lost the HHEICO contract to David Moench. The HHEICO
contract was subsequently sold to the Defendant's brother-in-law. (R. 642, 637-8, 721-8).
10. At the time he pledged the HHEICO contract as security, the Defendant was
aware that the note could be lost and that it was, in his words, a "moderate risk." (R. 644-6).
11. At the time the HHEICO contract was lost, the balance owing on the contract
was $262,951.41, with 218 payments remaining. Pursuant to the divorce decree, the Plaintiff
was entitled to payments of $505.05 per month for 218 months. (R. 393-4, 666-7; Exhibits P-5,
P-6).
12. The present value of the Plaintiffs interest in the HHEICO contract, based on
receiving $505.05 per month for 218 months at an interest rate of 9.75% (the contract rate), is
$51,509.37. (R. 383).
13. The Plaintiff relied upon the HHEICO contract proceeds for her support. (R.
743).
14. The Defendant did not encumber the HHEICO contract because of financial
necessity. (R. 749-50).

8

15. The total amount of money that the Plaintiff would have received under the
HHEICO contract had the Defendant not lost the same is $110,100.90. ($505.05 times 218) (R.
550).
16. The Plaintiff has incurred attorney fees in prosecuting this matter in the
amount of $2,708.35 and will incur additional attorney fees in defending this appeal. (R. 601).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Defendant's appeal should be dismissed because the issues raised therein are not
appealable. The Court's contempt order is an order of "civil contempt," and is not, therefore,
appealable as a matter of right.
The Defendant was properly found in contempt of Court for the following reasons:
1. The divorce decree awarded the Plaintiff a property interest in the HHEICO
contract. The Defendant did not have the right to sell, encumber or risk losing the contract
without the Plaintiff's consent.
2. The Defendant, with full knowledge of the terms set forth in the divorce decree
and their effect on the HHEICO contract, and without the Plaintiffs consent, pledged the
HHEICO contract to secure a high risk investment. The HHEICO contract was subsequently
lost.
3. The Defendant knew of his Court ordered obligation not to encumber, sell, or
risk losing the HHEICO contract. The Defendant willfully and knowingly refused to comply.
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4. The Defendant had the ability to comply with the provisions set forth in the
parties' divorce decree.
The trial Court provided sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law to support its
ruling. The Court's findings and conclusions are well supported by the record. Furthermore, the
trial Court properly denied Defendant's Motion to Dismiss because of adequate evidence
concerning the market value of the HHEICO contract and whether or not it had been
inappropriately discounted.
Finally, the trial Court properly awarded attorney fees because the Defendant failed to
object to the amount and the reasonableness of the fees. Moreover, attorney fees are allowed in
actions to enforce Court orders, and such awards are based solely on the trial Courts discretion.
The Court, in its Conclusions of Law, found that the fees requested were reasonable and
appropriate.
ARGUMENT
I. THE TRIAL COURT'S CONTEMPT RULING IS NOT APPEALABLE.
Whether a contempt order can be appealed depends on whether the order is classified as
civil or criminal.
Under modern authority, an order finding one guilty of criminal
contempt is generally considered to be a final order separate from the
ongoing proceedings and appealable as a matter of right.... On the
other hand, an order finding one to have committed civil contempt is
considered interlocutory and not appealable as a matter of right.
Von Hake v. Thomas, 759 P.2d 1162,1167 (Utah 1988).
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A contempt order is civil in nature if its purpose is remedial, "either to coerce an
individual to comply with a Court order given for the benefit of another party or to compensate
an aggrieved party for injuries resulting from the failure to comply with an order." Id. at p. 1168.
A contempt order which is criminal in nature is defined as follows:
A contempt order is criminal if its purpose is to vindicate the Courts
authority, as by punishing an individual for disobeying an order, even
if the order arises from civil proceedings. It is important to note that
it is the purpose, not the method of punishment, that serves to
distinguish the two types of proceedings.... One distinguishing factor
is whether the fine or sentence is conditional. A remedial purpose is
indicated when the contemnor is allowed to purge himself of the
contempt by complying with the Court's order.
Id. at p. 1168.
In this case, Judge Stirba's contempt order constitutes a finding of civil contempt. Her
order is clearly designed to compensate the Plaintiff for the Defendant's wrongdoing. The
Defendant can purge himself of the contempt and avoid going to jail by merely complying with
the order. Because of the civil nature of the order, it is not appealable as a matter of right, and
the Defendants appeal should therefore be dismissed.
II. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY FOUND THE DEFENDANT
IN CONTEMPT OF COURT.
In order to sustain a finding of contempt for failure to comply with a Court order, the
Defendant must: 1) have known of the duty imposed by the Court's Order, 2) had the ability to
comply with the Order, and 3) willfully and knowingly refused to comply. Utah Farm
Production Credit Association v. Labrum. 762 P.2d 1070 (Utah 1988); Von Hake v. Thomas. 759
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P.2d 1162 (Utah 1988). From the evidence presented at trial and the record of this proceeding, it
is clear that the above items have been more than satisfied.
A. THE DEFENDANT HAD A COURT ORDERED DUTY NOT
TO ENCUMBER, SELL OR RISK LOSING THE PLAINTIFF'S
INTEREST IN THE HHEICO CONTRACT.
The foundation argument for Defendant's appeal is that the divorce decree did not forbid
him, in any way, from selling, encumbering or disposing of the HHEICO contract. As a result,
the Defendant argues that he cannot be held in contempt for doing something he felt he was
entitled to do. The Defendant's argument is wholly without merit and should be disregarded for
the following reasons:
1. The Defendant had absolutely no right to sell or encumber the HHEICO contract. In
Utah, "when a decree of divorce is rendered, the Court may include in it equitable orders relating
to the children, property, debts or obligations and parties..." UCA 30-3-5(1). It follows that
Utah Courts have "broad equitable powers to make a fair distribution of parties' property
irrespective of the form of ownership in which it may be held." Matter of Estate of Manfield,
856 P.2d 1056 (Utah 1993).
In the instant case, the trial Court was well within its authority when it divided the
HHEICO contract. The HHEICO contract was marital property and was therefore subject to
division, even though the contract was only in Defendant's name. The Plaintiff became the
owner of 65% of the proceeds of the contract, thus holding a majority interest. Moreover, her
interest was worth a substantial amount of money ($110,000.90). The Defendant's argument that
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he had the unilateral right to sell, encumber or otherwise deal with the HHEICO contract, even at
the risk of losing it, so long as the Plaintiff received 65% of any proceeds resulting, is
incredulous. He had absolutely no right to deal with or risk losing the contract in any way
without first obtaining the Plaintiff's consent. His actions were motivated by selfishness and
greed, and are inexcusable.
2. The law of the case doctrine does not help the Defendant.
Early in this case, Judge Stirba stated that it appeared the divorce decree did not restrict
the Defendant from selling the contract, but that the Plaintiff was entitled to 65% of the net
proceeds from the sale of the note. This statement was made after a short hearing and before
Judge Stirba had heard any of the evidence at trial. After trial, Judge Stirba properly ruled that
the Defendant had no right to encumber or sell the contract. The Defendant argues that the "law
of the case" doctrine prevents the Court from changing or reconsidering its position. The
Defendant's argument is not a correct statement of Utah law.
In Utah, the "law of the case" doctrine does not prevent a judge from reconsidering his or
her previous non-final orders. Plumb v. State, 809 P.2d 734, 739 (Utah 1990). Several other
cases support this proposition. In Salt Lake City Court v. James Contractors, Inc., 761 P.2d 42,
45 (Utah App. 1988), the Utah Court of Appeals stated that "any judge is free to change his or
her mind on the outcome of the case until a decision is formally rendered." A similar ruling was
set forth in Bennion v. Hansen, 699 P.2d 757, 760 (Utah 1985). In this case, the Court indicated
that "the trial Court is not inexorably bound by its own precedents."
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The Defendant has conveniently ignored Utah law on this point. He cites only a 1912
U.S. Supreme Court Decision and a general article from the C.J.S. Furthermore, his reference to
UCA Section 78-7-19 is misleading. This section provides:
If an application for an Order made to a judge of a Court in which the actual
proceeding is pending, is refused in whole or in part or is granted conditionally, a
subsequent application for the same Order may not be made to any other judge,
except of a higher Court.(emphasis added)
Section 78-7-19 is clearly inapplicable to the facts in this case. The statute prohibits a
disgruntled party from going to another judge concerning an issue which has been previously
decided. For the above reasons, the Court properly modified its prior statement, and did not,
therefore, violate the "law of the case" doctrine.
B. THE DEFENDANT KNEW OF HIS OBLIGATION
CONCERNING THE HHEICO CONTRACT.
The divorce decree clearly sets forth the parties' rights and obligations with respect to
the HHEICO contract. Paragraph 7 of the decree provides:
The Plaintiff is awarded 65% of the net proceeds of the HHEICO contract and the
Defendant is awarded 35% of the net proceeds of the HHEICO contract. The current
net proceeds from the HHEICO contract are $770.00 per. (sic) The Plaintiff is
entitled to receive $505.00 per month and the Defendant is entitled to receive
$271.95 per month from the HHEICO contract. In the event the net amount received
from HHEICO contract shall differ from the $770.00 per month, then the parties shall
divide the net proceeds 65% to the Plaintiff and 35% to the Defendant.
The express language of the divorce decree conveys to Plaintiff a majority interest in the
HHEICO contract. It is implicit in the decree that the Defendant is not the sole owner of the
contract and could not, therefore, unilaterally sell or encumber it. Any such action would require
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the Plaintiff's prior consent. Furthermore, the Defendant's knowledge of the Plaintiff's interest
in the contract is undisputed. Consider the following:
1. The Defendant was represented by counsel in the divorce proceedings,
received a copy of the divorce decree, had read the same, was familiar with the provisions
contained therein, and did not formally object to any of the provisions. (R. 633-4, 706, 734-6).
2. The Defendant was aware of the provision in the divorce decree concerning the
HHEICO contract from the time the divorce was granted, consented to the same, and agreed that
the Plaintiff be awarded 65% of the net proceeds of the contract. Furthermore, it was never
agreed, implied or discussed that the Defendant would have the right to encumber the HHEICO
contract. (R. 634, 706, 736).
3. At the time the HHEICO contract was pledged, the Defendant was fully aware
of the provisions set forth in the divorce decree which gave Plaintiff 65% of the proceeds, and
knew she had an interest therein. He also had a copy of the decree at the time. Prior to pledging
the contract, the Defendant had been paying Plaintiff her share of the proceeds. (R. 706, 737,
750-1).3
3

The following are excerpts of the Defendant's testimony at trial on August 31, 1994:
Question (Mr. Hanks): Did you object to any provisions in the divorce decree?
Answer (Mr. Hammond): It was too late.
Q: Well, did you object to any?
A: No. (R p. 735 lines 18-22).
*

*

*

Q: You were aware, weren't you, that your ex-wife was given an interest in this HHEICO
contract, weren't you?
A: An interest? No, she was not given an interest in the contract.
Q: Let me show you paragraph 7. You have seen that paragraph before, haven't you?
15

The Defendant was fully aware of the Plaintiff's rights under the contract from the
time the divorce was granted. His interpretation of the decree and what he felt it allowed him to
do is unreasonable and ignores the Plaintiff's property rights.
C. THE DEFENDANT HAD THE ABILITY TO COMPLY WITH THE ORDER.
In order to comply with paragraph 7 of the decree, the Defendant simply had to divide the
monthly funds which he received from the HHEICO contract and pay Plaintiff her share. The

A: Yes I have.
Q: And that gives your ex-wife the right to receive $505 each month from the $777
resulting from that contract, doesn't it?
A: She is entitled to 65 percent of the net proceeds. It does not give her an interest in that
contract.
Q: But you're aware of that provision, weren't you?
A: Yes.
Q: And you were at the time the divorce was granted, weren't you?
A: Yes. And I didn't agree with it.
Q: But you agreed with the provision and the decree was signed, didn't you?
A: I agreed — yes.
Q: And you were aware of exactly what it said. Correct?
A: Yes.
Q: And at the time that the HHEICO contract was pledged, you were aware of that
contract. Correct?
A: Yes.
Q: Or the Decree. And you had a copy of the decree at that time, didn't you?
A: Like I said, I received it in July or August. (R p. 736 line 4 - p. 737 line 7).
Q: When you sold that contract, were you thinking of her at all?
A: Yes I was. I knew that, according to this divorce decree, there was an obligation on my
part to pay her 65 percent of the net proceeds that I received of that. (R p.750 lines 16-20)
*

*

*

Q: You sold the contract knowing full well of the obligation to pay her?
A: Yes. (R p. 751 lines 2-5).
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Defendant provided no evidence that he was unable to do this simple task. The Defendant's only
argument is that he was financially compelled to pledge the same. Not only is Defendant's
financial situation irrelevant to his ability to divide the monthly payments received from the
HHEICO contract, it provides no excuse, whatsoever for his actions. In fact, the Defendant's
testimony provided no hint of financial necessity. In his testimony of August 31,1995, the
Defendant stated that his financial requirements were based on what he "wanted" rather than
what he actually needed:
0 : You seem to try to tell the Court there was some incredible
pressure for you to sell or encumber the contract to save the home.
A: There was.
Q: But you could have, in fact, kept the money from the contract,
the $250.00, plus the amount you were already paying for the
mortgage to have more than enough to go out and rent a place.
A: For $650.00 I could have rented an apartment.
Q: So there wasn't a dire financial pressure, was there?
A: The pressure was I wanted to buy my son-in-law and daughter's
equity in the house and I wanted to remain in the house.
Q: You didn't have to do that.
A: You don't have to do anything in life, do you?
Q: But you wouldn't have been homeless, would you?
A: No.
Q: You would have had adequate funds to rent a place and been
just fine.
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A: I'm sure I could have rented a place.
Q: In fact, this deal that you did was not caused by financial
necessity, was it?
A: Yes, it was. I felt it was. I felt that I wanted to remain in that
house. I was engaged to be married. I wanted a place to live.
Q: And so you were totally thinking about your own wants and
desires and you didn't think at all about Berdene Dennison, did
you?
A: She has her own life now and I have my own life. I was
concerned about myself, my daughter and my future family and
wife.
Q: And you weren't thinking about her, were you?
A: She has her own life. (R p.749 lines 7-25; p.750 lines 1-14).
Additionally, "where there is a judgment that a party do an act... which judgment stands
unattacked, it is presumed that the party has the ability to perform; and that the complainant
makes a prima facie case of contempt by showing failure to comply with the judgment." Thomas
v. Thomas, 569 P.2d 1119,1121 (Utah 1977). The Defendant has failed to set forth any evidence
to rebut this presumption.
Finally, the Defendant's alleged inability to perform is no defense because his inability to
perform was the result of his own actions. Brown v. Cook, 123 Utah 505, 260 P.2d 544 (Utah
1953). Clearly, the Defendant's inability to pay Plaintiff 65% of the proceeds from the HHEICO
contract was caused by his own wrongful conduct, thereby rendering his actions inexcusable.
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D. THE COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT PROVIDE A SOLID BASIS FOR ITS
CONTEMPT RULING.
The Court provided ample facts on which to base a finding of contempt. First, the Court
found that the Defendant did not have the ability to sell or encumber the HHEICO contract and
that he was well aware of the provisions which created the Plaintiffs interest. Paragraphs 9,10,
and 11 of the Findings provide sufficient basis for this conclusion:
9. Paragraph 7 of the Divorce Decree clearly provides an income
stream to the Plaintiff from the HHEICO contract. The Defendant
was not entitled to take action, unilaterally, to defeat that right. The
Plaintiffs interest in the HHEICO contract was a bargained for
provision in the Divorce Decree. Both parties were represented by
counsel.
Mr. Hammond indicated that when he obtained the Divorce
Decree, he contacted his counsel because he evidently didn't like the
language set forth in paragraph 7. However, no action was taken to
amend the decree. The fact that Mr. Hammond complained to his
counsel and was not happy with that provision suggests, in and of
itself, that he was aware that there were limitations on what he could
do with that particular contract.
10. The HHEICO contract was lost because Mr. Hammond took
unilateral actions without conferring with the Plaintiff or obtaining
her consent to do the same.
11. It is plain to the Court, by clear and convincing evidence, that
under the express terms of paragraph 7, the Defendant had no right to
encumber the HHEICO contract and he had no right to risk losing it.
There did not need to be a specific provision in the decree to make
clear that he was prevented from encumbering the HHEICO contract.
By virtue of the language in the decree, it is clear that he was not
entitled to encumber that contract.
Second, the Findings dealt with Hammond's ability to comply with the order. Paragraph
13 of the Findings provides:
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13. The Defendant did not encumber the HHEICO contract because
of financial duress or compulsion. The Defendant claimed that he
encumbered the HHEICO contract in an investment designed to
return a large profit so that he could buy out his daughter and son-inlaw's interest in a house. The Defendant also testified that because
the investment went sour, the home was sold he used his share of the
proceeds to pay a debt owed to his mother. The Defendant was not
compelled or required to do either of the above. The Defendant was,
however, obligated to abide by the terms of the Divorce Decree which
provided a monthly payment to the Plaintiff. The Defendant ignored
his Court ordered obligation.
The record amply supports the Court's Conclusions and Finding of contempt. The
Court's findings, taken as a whole, clearly support a knowing and willful violation. The
Defendant was aware of the provision awarding Plaintiff an interest in the HHEICO contract and
acted in knowing and willful defiance thereof.
Finally, the Defendant has the burden, on appeal, to show that "in the light most
favorable to the trial Court, the evidence at trial was insufficient to support the trial Courts
findings." Utah Farm Bureau Production Credit Association, at p. 5-6. The evidence at trial, as
summarized in the Statement of Facts, provides overwhelming support for the trial Courts
findings. The Defendant has altogether failed to show where the evidence is lacking.
III.

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ORDERED THE DEEFENDANT TO
REPAY THE PLAINTIFF AND TO SERVE THIRTY DAYS IN JAIL.

In Utah, a Court has several options when imposing sanctions for contempt. The Court
can impose a jail sentence of up to 30 days (UCA 78-32-10), can award damages to the
aggrieved party (UCA 78-32-11), and can use imprisonment to compel performance (UCA 7832-12). The Court properly used each of these statutes to provide Plaintiff with an appropriate
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remedy.
The Defendant's argument that there is no basis for Plaintiff's damages should be
disregarded. The evidence at trial established that the HHEICO contract had 218 payments
remaining, and that the Plaintiff received $505.05 per month from each payment. There was no
evidence presented by the Defendant that the payments would cease.4 Even if they did cease, the
contract was secure because it was backed by real estate.
Finally, the Defendant argues that the Court's ruling constitutes an improper modification
of the divorce decree in violation of Rule 6-404(1) of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration.
This argument fails because the Defendant raises this issue for the first time on appeal. Even if
the Court were to consider the argument, it easily fails because the Court is not modifying the
decree, rather, the Court is enforcing the decree and sanctioning the Defendant for his contempt.

4

Q: (Mr. Hanks) Up to that time, Mr. Hammond, had you ever missed a payment? Had
you ever missed receiving a payment on the HHEICO contract?
A: (Mr. Hammond) Not that I can remember, no.
Q: So it provided a good stream of income, didn't it?
A: Yeah
Q: You had no reason to believe that those payments would ever cease, did you?
A: No, I didn't. (R. p. 743 line 22-25; p. 744 lines 1-5).
21

IV. THE TRIAL PROPERLY RULED ON THE DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO DISMISS.
The Defendant argues that the trial Court improperly denied his motion to dismiss
because there was no evidence presented as to the market value of the note and whether it was
discounted inappropriately. The Defendant's argument fails for the following reasons. First, the
Defendant never sold the note -- he risked it as collateral for a highly speculative mining venture
and subsequently lost it. He got absolutely nothing in return. This is certainly evidence of an
inappropriate discount.
Second, the Plaintiff provided ample evidence as to the value of the note. Exhibit P-6,
which is an amortization schedule of the HHEICO contract, shows that the contract would be
paid over a period of 249 months. Testimony at trial established that 31 payments had been
made, leaving 218 remaining. The principal balance of the contract at the time it was lost was
$274,993.00. Furthermore, the Defendant agreed that the present value of an income stream of
$505.05 per month for 218 months at an interest rate of 9.75% (the contract rate) is $51,509.37.
(R 383). This, of course, is the present value of the payments Plaintiff would have received had
the Defendant not interfered. This evidence is more than sufficient to establish the market value
of the note and whether it was inappropriately discounted.
V. THE PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEES,
INCLUDING ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL.
"In an action to enforce the provisions of a divorce decree, an award of attorney fees is
based solely upon the trial Courts discretion...". Lyngle v. Lyngle, 831 P.2d 1027 (Utah App.
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1992). Furthermore, attorney fees may be awarded in a contempt proceeding pursuant to UCA
Section 78-32-11. Envirotech Corp. v. Callahan , 872 P.2d 487 (Utah App. 1994). In addition,
when a party in a divorce action is awarded attorney fees at the trial level, and then prevails in an
appeal, attorney fees can be granted to the successful party. Lyngle at p. 1059.
In the instant case, Plaintiffs counsel proffered evidence as to the amount and
reasonableness of his fees. (R. 672-3; 708-9). It is significant that the Defendant never objected
to the reasonableness of the fees, and stated "this lump sum isn't too bad" when referring to
Plaintiffs flat fee arrangement. (R. 673, lines 4-9). Since the Defendant failed to object to the
reasonableness of the fees at the trial Court level, he cannot now raise the issue for the first time
on appeal. DeVilliers v. Utah County. 882 P.2d 1161,1168 (Utah App. 1994); Jensen v.
Bowcutt. 892 P.2d 1053 (Utah App. 1995).
The Defendant's argument that the Court made no reference to the reasonableness of the
fees is wrong. In paragraph 4 of the Conclusions of Law, the Court stated: "The attorney fees
and costs incurred by the Plaintiff are reasonable in amount and were necessarily incurred
because of the Defendant's actions."
Finally, the Defendant incorrectly states that the Plaintiff did not prevail in this action.
The Defendant's argument begs the question - "If the Plaintiff did not prevail, why is the
Defendant now pursuing this appeal?"
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CONCLUSION
This case turns on a simple question. Did the Defendant have or not have the right to
sell, encumber or risk losing the HHEICO contract without the Plaintiff's consent. The answer
is obvious. The Defendant's actions were in total disregard of Plaintiff's rights under the divorce
decree. The trial Court responded appropriately and its ruling should be upheld. Accordingly,
the Defendant's appeal should be dismissed and the Plaintiff be awarded her attorney fees and
costs for defending the same.
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